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Abstract 
 
The frame problem is the difficulty of explaining how non-magical systems think and act 
in ways that are adaptively sensitive to context-dependent relevance. Influenced centrally 
by Heideggerian phenomenology, Hubert Dreyfus has argued that the frame problem is, 
in part, a consequence of the assumption (made by mainstream cognitive science and 
artificial intelligence) that intelligent behaviour is representation-guided behaviour. 
Dreyfus’ Heideggerian analysis suggests that the frame problem dissolves if we reject 
representationalism about intelligence and recognize that human agents realize the 
property of thrownness (the property of being always already embedded in a context). I 
argue that this positive proposal is incomplete until we understand exactly how the 
properties in question may be instantiated in machines like us. So, working within a 
broadly Heideggerian conceptual framework, I pursue the character of a representation-
shunning thrown machine. As part of this analysis, I suggest that the frame problem is, in 
truth, a two-headed beast. The intra-context frame problem challenges us to say how a 
purely mechanistic system may achieve appropriate, flexible and fluid action within a 
context. The inter-context frame problem challenges us to say how a purely mechanistic 
system may achieve appropriate, flexible and fluid action in worlds in which adaptation 
to new contexts is open-ended and in which the number of potential contexts is 
indeterminate. Drawing on the field of situated robotics, I suggest that the intra-context 
frame problem may be neutralized by systems of special purpose adaptive couplings, 
while the inter-context frame problem may be neutralized by systems that exhibit the 
phenomenon of continuous reciprocal causation. I also defend the view that while 
continuous reciprocal causation is in conflict with representational explanation, special-
purpose adaptive coupling, as well as its associated agential phenomenology, may feature 
representations. My proposal has been criticized recently by Dreyfus, who accuses me of 
propagating a cognitivist misreading of Heidegger, one that, because it maintains a role 
for representation, leads me seriously astray in my handling of the frame problem. I close 
by responding to Dreyfus’ concerns.  
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1. Reviving the Frame Problem 
 
I’m prepared to bet that most cognitive scientists would agree, in broad terms at least, 
with the following thought: any system worthy of the epithet ‘intelligent’ must be able to 
retrieve from its memory just those items or bodies of stored information that are most 
relevant to its present context, and then decide how to use, update, or weight that 
information, in contextually appropriate ways, in processes such as belief fixation and 
action selection. But many of those same researchers would also agree that we don’t yet 
know how to explain this cognitive achievement scientifically – not really. The 
qualification ‘not really’ is important, because the prevailing view would be that the 
broad shape of the explanation has been known for a very long time, although the details 
remain to be settled. Intelligent behaviour is representation-guided behaviour. 
Intelligence is essentially a matter of sensitivity to information, and the capacity of 
certain systems to realize such informational sensitivity is explained at root by the fact 
that those systems are able to build, store and manipulate internal representations. Call 
this the orthodox representationalist story, henceforth ORS.  
 
Of course, if all ORS says is that intelligent agents are those agents that are configured 
(in our case by evolution and learning) so that they retrieve just those representations that 
are appropriate to a given context and then update, in contextually appropriate ways, just 
those representations that need to be updated, then the putative explanation on the table 
would be no more than a restatement, in representational language, of the phenomenon to 
be explained. An immediate response here may be that I am failing to see the scope and 
power of ORS, that part of what it means for an agent to build, store and manipulate 
internal representations is precisely for that agent to construct representations of any 
context in which it finds itself, and then to use those representations to guide its processes 
of search, selection and update. This idea will be assessed later. For now, as we edge our 
way into the issues, it is more important that we draw a general lesson from the way in 
which the response explicitly targets the question of context. That lesson is that phrases 
such as ‘appropriate to a given context’ and ‘in contextually appropriate ways’ are not 
innocent flourishes of the language in which we describe intelligence. Rather, they 
highlight a necessary feature of the phenomenon. In other, more dramatic, words, a 
theory of intelligence that fails to give us a satisfactory explanation of how cognitive 
processes achieve context-sensitivity is not an incomplete theory of intelligence, it is no 
theory of intelligence at all.   
 
 
As I shall use the term, the frame problem is the difficulty of explaining how non-magical 
systems (machines like us) think and act in ways that are adaptively sensitive to context-
dependent relevance. There was a time when the frame problem so conceived was a hot 
research topic in cognitive science, especially in artificial intelligence (AI). These days it 
may seem a little passé, which is a shame since (with sincere apologies to various 
researchers) it’s not as if anybody ever actually solved the problem. Maybe we just got 
bored reading and writing about it. In any case, it is high time we had a frame problem 
revival. As a contribution to this revival, the present paper has three main aims. The first 
(sections 2 and 3) is to explore a seminal analysis of the frame problem due to Hubert 
Dreyfus, an analysis in which Heideggerian phenomenology is deployed as an analytical 
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tool. The second (section 4) is to present what I take to be the beginnings of a potential 
solution to the frame problem, a solution that combines Heideggerian phenomenology 
and cognitive-scientific naturalism as mutually constraining influences. In pursuing these 
first two goals, the paper revolves around an updated (and so one hopes improved) 
version of an argument that I’ve presented before, although in its previous incarnation it 
was just one thread in a bigger project and so was realized in a somewhat diffuse and 
partially buried way (Wheeler, 2005).1 This previous attempt on my part to navigate the 
issues has been criticized recently by Dreyfus (2008). To the extent that these criticisms 
are on target, they apply just as much to the reworked treatment presented here as they 
did to the original one, so the third main aim of this paper (section 5) is to respond to 
Dreyfus’ concerns. Let’s begin, then, with a closer look at the frame problem itself.   
 
2. Stalking the Frame Problem   
 
The frame problem originated in logicist AI, where it first emerged as the problem of 
characterizing, using formal logic, those aspects of a state that are not changed by an 
action (see e.g. Genesereth and Nilsson, 1987). It soon turned out, however, that this 
original frame problem was just one dimension of a more general and multi-faceted 
difficulty confronted by any broadly mechanistic account intelligence, given the context-
embeddedness and relevance-sensitivity of cognition. (See the range of discussions in 
(Pylyshyn, 1987).) As a result the term ‘frame problem’ has taken on a wider meaning, 
although its historical roots are reflected in the fact that the ultimate litmus test for any 
proposed solution is still widely considered to be whether one could engineer a robot – a 
wholly mechanistic system acting in the real (dynamic, physical) world – that solved or 
avoided the problem precisely by implementing the proposal in question. Expressing a 
generalized version of the worry, Fodor famously describes the frame problem as ‘the 
problem of putting a “frame” around the set of beliefs that may need to be revised in the 
light of specified newly available information’ (Fodor, 1983: pp.112-13). This 
formulation still isn’t general enough, however, because knowing what to do is just as 
context-sensitive as knowing what to believe. Thus the frame problem is not merely a 
problem associated with belief-fixation, it is a problem associated with belief-fixation and 
action-selection. But now if we interpret ‘thinking’ broadly, so as to cover both of these 
cognitive phenomena, another of Fodor’s characterizations does get to the heart of the 
matter. Fodor (1987) glosses the frame problem as the problem of how a robot, when 
working out the consequences of its actions (and thus what it should do), could ever be 
completely confident that it hadn’t failed to consider something important. The frame 
problem is thus ‘Hamlet’s problem: when to stop thinking… viewed from an engineer’s 
perspective’ (Fodor, 1987: p.140). 
 
It might seem that what one needs to do here is find a mechanistic way of pragmatically 
limiting the search space to be explored. In this spirit Holland et al. (1986) write: ‘a 
processing mechanism of the sort we favor circumvents the problem of the potential 
relevance of everything in the knowledge store by pragmatically selecting limited areas 
                                                 
1
 Some passages in sections 2-4 of this paper adapt textual material from (Wheeler, 2005; 
2008).  
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of information to explore... By tending to fire the strongest and most goal-appropriate 
rules, a constrained search through the space of relevant information can be carried out’. 
But how does the system itself select the most goal-appropriate rules and information?  
One natural thought (in line with ORS, see above) is that it should deploy stored 
heuristics (internally represented rules of thumb) or representations of context that 
determine which of its stored bodies of information are relevant in the present situation. 
All this does, unfortunately, is push the problem one stage back. For how does the system 
decide which of its stored heuristics or potentially context-specifying representations are 
relevant? Another, higher-order set of heuristics or representations would seem to be 
required. But of course the same problem will re-emerge at that higher level. So, 
depending on how one looks at it, a combinatorial explosion or infinite regress beckons. 
Dreyfus gives voice to just this sort of point, when he considers the plight of an AI-
programmed computer faced with incoming environmental data:  
 
The significance to be given to each logical element [each internally 
represented piece of data] depends on other logical elements, so that in 
order to be recognized as forming patterns and ultimately forming objects 
and meaningful utterances each input must be related to other inputs by 
rules. But the elements are subject to several interpretations according to 
different rules and which rule to apply depends on the context. For a 
computer, however, the context itself can only be recognized according 
to a rule…  
          …[T]o pick out two dots in a picture as eyes one must have already 
recognized the context as a face. To recognize this context as a face one 
must have distinguished its relevant features such as shape and hair from 
the shadows and highlights, and these, in turn, can be picked out as 
relevant only in a broader context, for example, a domestic situation in 
which the program can expect to find faces. This context too will have to 
be recognized by its relevant features, as social rather than, say, 
meteorological, so that the program selects as significant the people 
rather than the clouds. But if each context can be recognized only in 
terms of features selected as relevant and interpreted in terms of a 
broader context, the AI worker is faced with a regress of contexts. 
(Dreyfus, 1992: pp.288-9) 
 
An infinite regress would be bad enough, but may not be the worst of it. As Horgan and 
Tienson (1994) point out, the context-sensitivity of cognition cannot be achieved by a 
system first retrieving an inner structure (an item of information or a heuristic), and then 
deciding whether or not it is relevant, as that would take us back to square one. But then 
how can the system assign relevance until the structure has been retrieved? The result is a 
kind of cognitive paralysis.  
 
Despite what has been said so far, one might be tempted to think that the frame problem 
is a difficulty only for ideally rational systems in search of optimal behaviour, and that it 
is pretty much irrelevant in the case of real human beings, who famously enjoy only 
bounded rationality (Shanahan, 2006). According to the bounded rationality model 
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(Simon, 1955), human beings get by (we satisfice rather than optimize) on the basis of 
certain cognitive tricks, limitations and constraints that characterize our less-than-ideal 
rationality. These might include ignoring features that are shared by incompatible 
options, imperfect recall (here an adaptively beneficial property), and, given that there are 
cognitive-resourcing costs associated with gathering and holding information, making 
decisions about what one should know.2  In the present context, however, it is 
questionable just what the bounded rationality picture buys us. In some cases, for 
example in deciding what to know, it looks as if determining when to use the trick might 
itself be a context-sensitive affair, in which case the frame problem continues to apply 
directly. Indeed, the response from bounded rationality would be reduced to nothing more 
than a fancy version of the appeal to heuristics to reduce the informational search space. 
But perhaps the idea is that the tricks, limitations and constraints apply in a context-
independent manner, in which case it is desperately unclear that such across-the-board 
processing restrictions will reliably have the effect of blunting the search problem in the 
right kind of way. For sure, some options and some information won’t be considered, but 
unless the pairing down of the search space is done in a relevance-guided manner, there 
seems to be no reason to think that the boundary between considered and ignored will in 
any way reflect the boundary between relevant and irrelevant, so the frame problem will 
remain in force.  
 
About now one might be moved to wonder why AI hasn’t simply ground to a halt in the 
jaws of the frame problem. According to many theorists (e.g. Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1988; 
Brooks, 1991; Cliff, 1994; Dreyfus, 2008), most AI researchers (classical and 
connectionist) have typically managed to side-step the frame problem by assuming that 
real-world problem-solving can be treated as a kind of messy and complicated 
approximation to reasoning (or learning) in artificially restricted worlds that are relatively 
static, essentially closed, and feature some small number of contexts of action. In such 
worlds, all the contexts that could possibly arise may be identified and defined, alongside 
all the factors that could possibly count as relevant within each of them. So the system 
designer can take comprehensive and explicit account of the effects of every action or 
change. And if this strategy incurs a prohibitive processing load, the designer can either 
(i) work on the assumption that nothing changes unless it is explicitly said to change by 
some rule, or (ii) use carefully targeted relevancy heuristics. The upshot is that in such 
well-defined and well-behaved problem-domains, the frame problem is no more than a 
nuisance. The fact is, however, that the actual world often consists of an indeterminate 
number of dynamic, open-ended, complex scenarios in which context-driven and context-
determining change is common and ongoing, and in which vast ranges of cognitive space 
might, at any time, contain the relevant psychological elements. It is in this sort of world 
that the frame problem really bites, and in which the problem-solving strategies that have 
been successful in toy worlds and toy domains will fail to deliver.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 This list comes from Rubinsetin (1998), although the author himself remains largely 
neutral about the psychological validity of the constraints and strategies in question.   
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3. From a Phenomenological Point of View  
 
ORS (the orthodox representationalist story) is the generic picture of cognition on which 
mainstream cognitive science and AI (classical and connectionist) is built. Now I want to 
forge an explicit link between ORS and the frame problem, by briefly exploring an 
analysis due to Hubert Dreyfus. As I shall interpret him, Dreyfus offers us a tripartite 
diagnosis of why ORS invites the frame problem. This diagnosis turns on 
phenomenological insights drawn from the work of Heidegger (e.g. 1927) and Merleau-
Ponty (e.g. 1962). However, given the Heideggerian character of the steps towards a 
solution to the frame problem that I shall take later in this paper, I shall place the present 
interpretative emphasis on the Heideggerian dimension of Dreyfus’ analysis, as he 
himself sometimes does (e.g. Dreyfus 1990).    
 
The first part of Dreyfus’ analysis turns on the massively holistic character of contextual 
significance, as revealed by Heideggerian phenomenology. Famously, Heidegger argues 
that we ordinarily encounter entities as equipment, that is, as being for certain sorts of 
tasks (typing, cooking, hair-care, and so on). Entities so encountered have their own 
distinctive kind of intelligibility that Heidegger calls readiness-to-hand. He introduces 
the term involvements to capture the significance of equipmental entities (the ways in 
which they are involved) in our everyday activities and tasks. Crucially, for Heidegger, 
an involvement is not a stand-alone structure, but rather a link in a network of 
intelligibility that he calls a totality of involvements. Thus I am currently working with a 
computer (an involvement that Heidegger calls a with-which), in the practical context of 
my office (an in-which), in order to write this paper (an in-order-to), which is aimed 
towards developing an analysis of the frame problem (a towards-this), for the sake of my 
academic work, that is, for the sake of my being an academic (a for-the-sake-of-which). 
Totalities of involvements constitute the contexts of everyday human activity, the 
contexts that, as we have seen, determine what is relevant at a given time and thereby 
provide the backdrop for the frame problem. To glimpse the frame problem here, one 
needs to appreciate the extent of Heidegger’s holism. Once one begins to trace a path 
through a network of involvements, one will inevitably traverse vast regions of 
involvement-space. Thus connections will be traced not only from computers to offices to 
paper-writing to academia, but also from computers to computer games to negotiating 
with my son over how much time he should be allowed to play such games to good 
parenting. This behaviour will refer back to many other behaviours (taking my son to 
football training on a Saturday morning, taking him to see Hibernian FC play) and thus to 
many other items of equipment (footballs, football boots, replica kits, match-day 
programmes), and so on. Contextual significance is thus massively holistic. 
 
Having adopted Heidegger’s picture, Dreyfus argues that the massively holistic character 
of contextual significance presents ORS with a serious difficulty. As we have seen, one 
way in which the mechanistic agent designed according to the ORS blueprint is supposed 
to achieve context-sensitivity is by internally representing the contexts within which 
belief-fixation or action-selection needs to occur. From a Heideggerian perspective, 
however, any attempt to internally reconstruct highly distributed and interconnected 
networks of involvements, by building inner representations of those networks (e.g. as 
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atomic nodes and the links between them), looks to be a prohibitively difficult, and 
perhaps even an infinite, task. With Heideggerian holism on the table, one might think it 
unsurprising that ORS will encounter the combinatorial explosion that is one tell-tale sign 
of the frame problem.  
 
The second part of Dreyfus’ analysis turns on the issue of skills. According to Dreyfus, to 
have a skill is to ‘come into a situation with a readiness to deal with what normally shows 
up in that sort of situation’ (Dreyfus, 1990: p.117). In other words, it is to be equipped 
with a prior capacity to be flexibly sensitive to what is (normally) relevant in that kind of 
context. This takes us back to the notion of equipment. For Heidegger, we achieve our 
primary relationship with equipment not by looking at the entity in question, or by some 
detached intellectual or theoretical study of it, but rather by skillfully manipulating it in a 
hitch-free manner, where at least part of what it means to manipulate an item of 
equipment skillfully is to be sensitive to contextual factors. Following others, I shall call 
this primary mode of engagement with entities smooth coping. Smooth coping is the 
principal instantiation of Dreyfusian skills. Moreover, smooth coping realizes a mode of 
knowledge. As Heidegger puts it: the ‘kind of dealing which is closest to us is... not a 
bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and 
puts them to use; and this has its own kind of ‘knowledge’’ (Heidegger, 1927: p.95). In 
contemporary philosophical terminology, this mode of knowledge would standardly be 
identified as a form of knowledge-how. 
 
Although smooth coping is the principal way in which Dreyfusian skills are manifested, it 
is not, I think, the only way. According to Heidegger, un-readiness-to-hand is a species 
of intelligibility that emerges when smooth coping is disturbed by broken or 
malfunctioning equipment, discovered-to-be-missing equipment, or in-the-way 
equipment. When confronted by the un-ready-to-hand, the human agent adopts a strategy 
of practical problem solving (e.g. executing a repair). But notice that the broken, 
malfunctioning, missing or obstructive status of un-ready-to-hand entities is defined 
relative to a particular equipmental context. Thus a driver does not encounter a punctured 
tyre as a lump of rubber of a measurable mass; she encounters it as a damaged item of 
equipment, that is, as the cause of a disruption to her driving activity. Heidegger is clear 
that when ‘something cannot be used – when, for instance, a tool definitely refuses to 
work – it  can be conspicuous only in and for dealings in which something is 
manipulated’ (Heidegger, 1927: p.406). So practical problem solving in the domain of the 
un-ready-to-hand remains context-sensitive. In at least some cases, this will be another 
manifestation of a Dreyfusian skill, and thus of knowledge-how. The qualification ‘in at 
least some cases’ allows for examples of practical problem solving that approximate, 
without quite becoming, the kind of theoretical reasoning distinctive of science, a 
detached reflective engagement that reveals entities in the context-independent mode of 
intelligibility that Heidegger calls presence-at-hand.3 
                                                 
3
 We should register the following subtlety in Heidegger’s analysis. According to 
Heidegger it is an essential fact about human cognition that it always operates within 
some sort of context of activity. However, when an agent adopts the detached theoretical 
attitude, she enters a special kind of context of activity, one in which the entities thereby 
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For the advocate of ORS, a Dreyfusian skill (flexible sensitivity to a context) must result 
from the inner deployment of context-specifying representations. From a Heideggerian 
perspective, however, this attempt to explain the phenomenon appears seriously 
misguided. Here is my reconstruction of Dreyfus’ argument:  
 
1. The representations favoured by ORS are a form of knowledge-that. 
2. A Dreyfusian skill is a kind of knowledge-how.  
3. Knowledge-how cannot be reduced to knowledge-that. 
So   
4. ORS must fail to explain Dreyfusian skills.   
 
According to Dreyfus, then, ORS radically misconceives the kind of knowledge that 
underlies the way in which we enter situations with a readiness to deal with what 
normally shows up in those situations. It is perhaps unsurprising that what results is a 
difficulty like the frame problem.   
 
To bring the third, final and most important dimension of Dreyfus’ analysis into view, 
consider the following quotation from Heidegger.  
 
What we ‘first’ hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the 
creaking waggon, the motor-cycle.  We hear the column on the march, 
the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling... It requires a 
very artificial and complicated frame of mind to ‘hear’ a ‘pure noise’. 
The fact that motor-cycles and waggons are what we proximally hear is 
the phenomenal evidence that in every case Dasein [the human agent], as 
Being-in-the-world, already dwells alongside what is ready-to-hand 
within-the-world; it certainly does not dwell proximally alongside 
‘sensations’; nor would it first have to give shape to the swirl of 
sensations to provide a springboard from which the subject leaps off and 
finally arrives at a ‘world’ [a context].  Dasein, as essentially 
understanding, is proximally alongside what is understood. (Heidegger, 
1927: p.207) 
 
As Heidegger lays things out, his opponent thinks that the human agent is in primary 
epistemic contact with a set of context-independent primitives (e.g. raw sense data, such 
as an experience of a patch of red) to which context-dependent significance must 
somehow be added by cognitively downstream  processing. By contrast, Heidegger’s 
own view is that the agent is in primary epistemic contact not with bare context-
independent elements, but rather with equipment, the kind of entity that comes already 
laden with context-dependent significance. This is an aspect of the phenomenon that 
                                                                                                                                                 
disclosed are fully context-independent. So although there is, in Heidegger’s picture, no 
such thing as a fully decontextualized subject, there are fully decontextualized objects. 
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Heidegger calls thrownness, the fact that the human agent always finds herself located in 
a meaningful context (what Heidegger means here by a ‘world’) in which things matter to 
her. 
  
There seems little doubt that ORS, as realized in mainstream cognitive science, sides with 
Heidegger’s opponent here. For example, Marr (1982) famously assumed that the main 
task confronting vision is to derive representations of the 3D shapes of objects from 2D 
arrays of light intensity values at the retina. Here both the representational input to vision  
(the 2D array of light intensity values at the retina) and its output (models of the 3D 
shapes of objects) are context-independent representations. Contextual significance is a 
cognitively downstream addition. In Dreyfus’ analysis, this explains why the inner 
representations appealed to by ORS require additional elements (such as relevancy 
heuristics) in order to determine which of those representations are appropriate to any 
particular context. We might put it like this: All the level 0 elements in an ORS-style 
cognitive architecture are context-independent in nature, so context-dependent relevance 
needs to be assigned, at level 1, by further elements. But these level 1 elements require 
yet further elements, at level 2, to determine their correct contextual application. Why? 
Because those level 1 elements are, in the first instance, context-independent in nature. 
But the level 2 elements in question require yet further elements, at level 3, to determine 
their correct contextual application. Why? Because those level 2 elements are, in the first 
instance, context-independent in nature… and so on. On this analysis, it is unsurprising 
that the repeated application of the orthodox strategy (the use of progressively higher 
order relevance-assigning elements) succeeds only in pushing the problem of relevance 
further and further back. The intrinsic context-independence of the elements in play, at 
whatever level of depth they are first applied, explains this regress.  
 
So, as I interpret him, Dreyfus holds, on Heideggerian grounds, that the frame problem 
can be traced to three things: (i) that ORS’s representation-building strategy runs aground 
in the face of contextual holism, (ii) that our ability to behave in context-sensitive ways is 
conceived by ORS as a form of knowledge-that when in fact it is a form of knowledge-
how; and most importantly (iii) that an infinite regress results from the need for an ORS-
designed cognitive system to assign relevance to its intrinsically context-free 
representations. So do we now call time on ORS and its cognitive-scientific adherents? 
Not quite. To see why ORS is not yet out of the game, we need to begin by noting that 
although I have stressed the critical aspect of Dreyfus’ analysis, it can also be read as 
offering a Heideggerian solution to the frame problem, or, more accurately, as offering a 
Heideggerian dissolution of the frame problem. This has two prongs:  
 
1. Reject all forms of representationalism about intelligence. In a recent paper, 
Dreyfus declares that ‘for Heidegger, all representational accounts are part of the 
problem’ (Dreyfus, 2008: p.358). This move frees the cognitive scientist from the 
need to represent context and removes the temptation to treat skills as a form of 
knowledge-that rather than a mode of knowledge-how.  
 
2. Argue that since human agents are characterized by thrownness, they are always 
already embedded in some meaningful context. Because of this, human agents are 
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never in the position of having to add contextual significance to context-
independent primitives (see Dreyfus, 1992: p.262-3).  
 
The idea, then, is that for a representation-shunning thrown agent, the frame problem 
simply doesn’t arise.  
 
Unfortunately, from the perspective of cognitive science, this Heideggerian dissolution of 
the frame problem is radically incomplete. There is something like a Kuhnian argument 
here. Kuhn (1970) argued that a crisis in an established scientific paradigm is no more 
than a necessary precondition for the rejection of that paradigm. A crisis turns into a 
scientific revolution (a transition between paradigms) only when an established paradigm 
is successfully challenged by a genuine rival. Ideally, this rival should either demonstrate 
the potential to solve the problems faced by the previous paradigm, or avoid those 
problems altogether, in the sense that they simply do not arise for it. (Measuring the 
weight of phlogiston was a significant problem for some pre-Lavoisierian chemists, but a 
non-issue for Lavoisier.) In general, then, Kuhnian reasoning supports the following 
thought. Whatever problems mainstream cognitive science may currently face, there is no 
justifiable basis for fundamental change unless a plausible suggestion for an alternative 
explanatory framework (preferably one for which there is some good evidence of early 
empirical success) has emerged. So now let’s apply this Kuhnian reasoning more 
precisely. What it tells us is that even if ORS, in the form of mainstream cognitive 
science, has no good answer to the frame problem, that is no reason for cognitive science 
to reject its tenets in favour of Dreyfus’ proposed Heideggerian alternative, unless a 
plausible solution to, or dissolution of, the frame problem is available within that new 
approach. But didn’t we just get offered such a dissolution? Well, no, not from the 
perspective of cognitive science. This is because we don’t as yet have any account of how 
Dreyfus’ proposal could be realized by the kind of non-magical, mechanistic system that 
provides the material for cognitive-scientific explanation. What we need, then, is a 
plausible example of a representation-shunning thrown machine.  
 
This is a point that, in mildly different terms, I have made before (Wheeler, 2005). 
Recently, Dreyfus has taken up the challenge. Later in this paper I shall have something 
to say about his own specific suggestion for how a Heideggerian cognitive science might 
go. First, however, I want to present my own suggestions for how to begin to develop a 
Heideggerian response to the frame problem that takes seriously the Kuhnian argument. 
As we shall see, this response embraces the thought that part of the story will be a 
mechanistic explanation of thrownness, but it refuses the Dreyfusian call to shun 
representations altogether. That tension between Dreyfus’ analysis and my own will be 
explained in the next section and its resolution will form part of the business of section 5.      
 
4. Thrown Machines   
 
Dreyfus is surely right that thrownness must be part of any Heideggerian solution to the 
frame problem. In addition, as we have just seen, if we are to give a response to the frame 
problem that will satisfy the cognitive scientist, we need to supplement 
phenomenological analysis and provide an account of the mechanisms that causally 
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explain how an agent may be thrown. In my view this account has already been given 
(although not in explicitly Heideggerian terms) within the area of contemporary AI 
sometimes known as situated robotics. Researchers in situated robotics favour the design 
and construction of complete robots that are capable of integrating perception and action 
in real time so as to generate fast and fluid embodied adaptive behaviour. In addition, 
such roboticists shun the classical cognitive-scientific reliance on detailed internal world 
models, on the grounds that such structures are computationally expensive to build and 
keep up to date. Instead they adopt a design strategy according to which the robot 
regularly senses its environment to guide its actions (examples in a moment). It is this 
specific behaviour-generating strategy that marks out a robot as situated (Brooks, 1991).4 
Against this background, one of the key ideas from situated robotics is that much of the 
richness and flexibility of intelligence is down not to general-purpose processes of 
reasoning and inference, but to integrated suites of special-purpose adaptive couplings 
that combine neural mechanisms (or their robotic equivalent), non-neural bodily factors, 
and environmental elements, as ‘equal partners’ in the behaviour-generating strategy 
(again, examples in a moment). In my view, situated special-purpose adaptive couplings 
may make it intelligible to us how it is that unmysterious causal processes, such as those 
realized subagentially in brains, can give rise to the agential level phenomenon of 
thrownness. To unpack this claim I shall return to an example I have used a number of 
times before, because it makes the key point so clearly.  
 
Consider the ability of the female cricket to find a mate by tracking a species-specific 
auditory advertisement produced by the male. According to Barbara Webb’s robotic 
model of the female cricket’s behaviour, here, roughly, is how the phonotaxis system 
works (for more details, see Webb, 1993; 1994; or the discussion in Wheeler, 2005). The 
basic anatomical structure of the female cricket’s peripheral auditory system is such that 
the amplitude of her ear-drum vibration will be higher on the side closer to a sound-
source. Thus, if some received auditory signal is indeed from a conspecific male, all the 
female needs to do to reach him (all things being equal) is to continue to move in the 
direction indicated by the ear-drum with the higher amplitude response. So how is it that 
the female tracks only the correct stimulus? The answer lies in the activation profiles of 
two interneurons (one connected to each of the female cricket’s ears) that mediate 
between ear-drum response and motor behaviour. The decay rates of these interneurons 
are tightly coupled with the specific temporal pattern of the male’s song, such that signals 
with the wrong temporal pattern will simply fail to produce the right motor-effects.  
 
Now, here is Webb’s own explanation of why the mechanism just described is adaptively 
powerful: ‘Like many other insects, the cricket has a simple and distinctive cue to find a 
mate, and consequently can have a sensory-motor mechanism that works for this cue and 
nothing else: there is no need to process sounds in general, provided this specific sound 
has the right motor effects. Indeed, it may be advantageous to have such specificity built 
                                                 
4
 In contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science, the term ‘situated’ is often 
used to mean ‘environmentally embedded’. In this paper I shall use it exclusively to name 
the specific behaviour-generating strategy described in the main text, which one might 
think of as a form of environmental embedding.  
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in, because it implicitly provides ‘recognition’ of the correct signal through the failure of 
the system with any other signal’ (Webb, 1993: p.1092). So the situated special-purpose 
adaptive coupling that constitutes the cricket phonotaxis mechanism works correctly only 
in the presence of the right, contextually relevant input. A reasonable gloss on this picture 
is that, rather than starting outside of context and having to find its way in using 
relevancy heuristics and so on, the cricket’s special purpose mechanism, in the very 
process of being activated by a specific environmental trigger, brings a context of activity 
along with it, implicitly realized in the very operating principles which define that 
mechanism’s successful functioning. Here, context is not something that certain causal 
mechanisms must reconstruct, once they have been triggered. Rather, context is 
something that is always there at the point of triggering, in the adaptive fabric of the 
activated mechanism. This, I suggest, is the subagential mechanistic mark of 
thrownness.5  
 
There is a worry here. Shaun Gallagher is concerned that, in my account, ‘the term 
‘context’ is bouncing a little too freely between agent level [phenomenological] and 
subagential level [mechanistic] discourse’ (Gallagher, 2007). If I understand this 
correctly, the criticism rests on the thought that context is an exclusively agential level 
                                                 
5
 One might complain that the cricket simply doesn’t have a context, so whatever the 
adaptive contribution of the phonotaxis mechanism may be, it cannot causally explain 
context-sensitive behaviour. This argument is not compelling because the opening 
premise is arguably false. The meaningful and thus normatively loaded character of non-
human animal behaviour is manifestly obvious, and although Heidegger got himself into 
all sorts of trouble over the issue of non-human animals (Derrida, 1989), I see no 
insurmountable barrier to conceiving such meaning and normativity in terms of contexts 
(networks of significance). That said, the criticism might be resurrected in the following 
form: although the cricket has a context, it is not a context in anything like the human 
sense, so whatever the adaptive contribution of the phonotaxis mechanism may be, it 
cannot causally explain context-sensitive behaviour in a way that throws light on human-
level context-sensitivity. This is a more serious worry, but I remain unmoved. Of course 
insect-level contexts are not the same as human-level contexts. At a minimum the former 
are presumably comprised entirely of evolutionarily determined norms, whereas the latter 
involve a complex combination of evolutionary and cultural determination. But this 
genuine difference should not blind us to the fact that the context-sensitivity in question, 
whatever the source of the contexts themselves, may be causally achieved by a similar 
underlying process, that is, by the activity of situated special-purpose adaptive couplings. 
At this point my critic might reply that the cricket’s phonotaxis mechanism is hard-wired 
by evolution, whereas many of the routines that enable human beings to navigate cultural 
contexts will be installed by learning. However, with regard to the present issue, this is 
not a difference that makes a difference. As long as the notion of a ‘mechanism’ is not 
understood in some overly restrictive manner, installed routines of the sort at issue will 
count as cognitive mechanisms; and there is no reason to think that the learned status of 
those routines must prevent them from being situated special-purpose adaptive couplings. 
For further discussion of how to think about animal worlds from a broadly Heideggerian 
perspective, see (Wheeler, 1995; 2005).      
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phenomenon that cannot legitimately appear (explicitly or implicitly) at the mechanistic, 
subagential level. If that is what one thinks, then my claim that there is a sense in which 
one can find context ‘down there’ in the causal mechanisms seems to endorse a 
reductionist picture that, whatever its plausibility outside of Heideggerian circles (not 
very high, I suspect), is anyway clearly not available within them. So what should I say? 
Gallagher’s worry alerts us to the fact we need to be careful about what ‘context in the 
causal mechanisms’ might mean. I have argued that we need to identify unmysterious 
causal mechanisms at the subagential level that make it intelligible to us how certain 
phenomenological descriptions, such as thrownness, could be true of whole agents. 
However, this demand need not be heard reductively, because intelligibility may be 
secured without reduction. Crucially this remains true, I think, even if we decide to use 
some of our familiar agential terms as explanatory terms of art at the subagential level.  
 
One story about how this might work may be given if we apply a moral drawn from 
McDowell (1994). McDowell argues that when we attribute mental content to whole 
agents, we are saying something that is literally true or false. By contrast, cognitive-
scientific explanations that attempt to account for agential phenomena by describing 
informational transactions within a subagential control system, and which thus attribute 
representational contents to neurally realized vehicles, are engaged in a practice of 
attributing only metaphorical content to those vehicles. This is no threat to the 
explanatory credentials of cognitive science however, because, in McDowell’s own 
words, ‘it is surely clear, at least in a general way, how content-attribution that is only ‘as 
if’ can even so pull its weight in addressing a genuine explanatory need: the question is 
what enables us animals to be the semantic engines we are’ (McDowell, 1994: p.199). 
McDowell’s claim that subagential content must be metaphorical in character is only one 
way of playing out the key idea here, which is a good thing because that claim is 
unnecessarily strong. As long as there is a real and important difference between agential 
and subagential content (e.g. in the conditions for what counts as a representation, or in 
how to fix content), such that the former cannot be reduced to the latter, then we can have 
our cake (we can use a term such as ‘content’ at the subagential level) and eat it too (we 
don’t need to ‘go metaphorical’ about the subagential use of that term). It seems to me 
that the lesson here generalizes to other terms whose conceptual home is agential level 
discourse but which, to address a genuine explanatory need, may become terms of art at 
the subagential level; and that includes the term ‘context’. When we talk of context-
sensitivity at the agential level, we describe a necessary aspect of what it is for an 
intelligent agent to competently inhabit its environment. When we talk of context being 
‘brought along’ by certain subagential mechanisms, of context being ‘always there at the 
point of subagential triggering’, or of context being ‘woven into the adaptive fabric of the 
activated mechanism’, we are giving further expression to the point that such 
mechanisms do not causally underpin agential level context-sensitivity by virtue of 
building structures that subagentially represent context, but rather by virtue of the fact 
that they are situated special-purpose adaptive couplings (more on this below). This 
should go some way towards allaying Gallagher’s worry. 
 
Next I want to argue that we should refuse Dreyfus’ invitation to shun representations. 
Rather, we should tame those troublesome entities and put them in their place. This might 
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seem like an odd strategy for me to pursue. After all, the cricket’s phonotactic mechanism 
is surely non-representational in character, which appears to provide some support for 
Dreyfus’ anti-representational stance. But although, as a matter of fact, many situated-
robotics-style explanations of intelligent action appeal to non-representational adaptive 
mechanisms, representations have not been excised entirely from the overall picture. 
Rather, the situated roboticist’s characteristic upgrading of the behaviour-generating 
contributions made by the non-neural body and the environment sometimes leads to the 
traditional reliance on representational elements being reconfigured rather than rejected 
altogether. Crucially for the argument of this paper, this reconfiguration allows the 
mechanisms concerned to continue to display the subagential mechanistic mark of 
thrownness, as exhibited in the case of Webb’s cricket robot.   
 
To illustrate these points I shall turn to another example that I have used before. 
Franceschini et al. (1992) set themselves the task of building a robot that navigates its 
way to a light source while avoiding obstacles. The resulting system achieves this goal by 
executing a sequence of movements, each of which is generated in the following way. A 
primary visual system, inspired, in part, by the compound eye of the fly, features a layer 
of elementary motion detectors (EMDs). Since these components are sensitive only to 
movement, the primary visual system is blind at rest. What happens, however, is that the 
EMD layer uses relative motion information, generated by the robot’s own bodily motion 
during the immediately preceding movement in the sequence, to build a temporary snap 
map of detected obstacles, constructed using an egocentric coordinate system. Then, in an 
equally temporary motor map, information concerning the angular bearings of those 
detected obstacles is fused with information concerning the angular bearing of the light 
source (supplied by a supplementary visual system) and a direction-heading for the next 
movement is generated. This heading is as close as possible to the one that would take the 
robot straight towards the light source, adjusted so that the robot avoids all detected 
obstacles.  
 
Notice that the ways in which objects are represented by this robot’s action-generating 
maps are deeply dependent upon the specific obstacle-avoiding-homing context and the 
manner in which the robot uses its own history of physical movement and its close 
coupling to its local environment to structure its behaviour. The shape, absolute position, 
and/or orientation of objects are neither calculated nor stored. Consider, for example, 
objects other than lights. These are located as distally located edges fixed by contrast 
points in the optic flow. The obstacle-avoidance mechanism treats these contrast points as 
revealing regions of the environment from which to steer away, defined in terms of 
angular bearings relative to the robot itself. Thus objects (other than lights) are 
represented as avoidance-regions or motion-barriers in an egocentrically defined space. 
Pulling out the key lessons, we can say that the representations in question are action-
specific, in that they are tailored to the job of producing the particular navigational 
behaviour required and are designed to represent the world in terms of specifications for 
possible actions; they are egocentric, in that the snap map of detected obstacles features 
an agent-centred coordinate system, and the motor map exploits agent-based angular 
bearings; and they are intrinsically context-dependent, in that, as in the case of the cricket 
phonotaxis mechanism, the explicit representation of context is eschewed in favour of   
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situated special-purpose adaptive couplings that implicitly define the context of activity 
in their basic operating principles. This is, of course, the aforementioned subagential 
mechanistic mark of thrownness. 
 
Borrowing a term (although not its precise usage) from Andy Clark (1997), I shall call 
states that have the foregoing profile, action-oriented representations. But now isn’t it the 
case that my resurrection of a representational form of explanation has a decidedly un-
Heideggerian ring to it? I think not, because, as I interpret Heidegger, the mechanism-
based action-oriented representations that I have just described have phenomenological 
counterparts in the arena of practical problem solving in the domain of the un-ready-to-
hand. To see how this works, we need to do some groundwork on the relationship 
between agential level representations and the subject-object dichotomy. It is, I think, 
hard to see how to make sense of an agent enjoying psychological re-presentations of its 
world unless that agent is already in some way understood to be a subject over and 
against an independent world of objects, with the cognitive distance between agent and 
world that such an arrangement implies. This suggests that the presence of a subject-
object dichotomy is necessary for agential, and thus for phenomenological, 
representation. But what about the reverse dependency? Is the presence of agential 
representation necessary for there to be a subject-object dichotomy? Perhaps in this case 
‘necessary’ is too strong. However, where there exists a subject-object dichotomy there 
exists the issue of how that subject gains epistemic access to the independent world of 
objects that it inhabits. The issue here might be put by way of the following question: 
how is it that an agent is able to gain competent and appropriate epistemic access to its 
world, given that it is not merely distinguishing itself from that world, but distinguishing 
itself from that world in a particular way – that is, precisely as a subject distinguished 
from a collection of independent objects? Although an answer to this question may not 
strictly necessitate an explanation in terms of structures that stand in for or encode 
worldly states of affairs, that is, in terms of representations, it certainly invites one.  
 
The first of these dependencies helps us to come to terms with the Heideggerian thought 
that smooth coping in the domain of the ready-to-hand has a non-representational 
phenomenology. Smooth coping involves a form of awareness in which there are no 
subjects and no objects, only the experience of the ongoing task (e.g. typing). If the 
presence of a subject-object dichotomy is necessary for agential representation, then the 
non-representational character of smooth coping is no mystery. To see the importance of 
the second dependency, let’s think about what happens when smooth coping is disrupted 
and we enter the realm of un-readiness-to-hand. At this point a cognitive distance is 
introduced between agent and entity, a distance that may be understood as the gradual 
emergence of the subject-object dichotomy. Heidegger puts this in terms of the way in 
which, in un-readiness-to-hand, readiness-to-hand is gradually usurped by presence-at-
hand. Thus the human agent is progressively revealed as a detached theoretical reasoner 
over and against entities revealed as context-independent objects to which that subject 
has access.6 For example, Heidegger writes: ‘[t]he more urgently… we need what is 
missing, and the more authentically it is encountered in its un-readiness-to-hand, all the 
                                                 
6
 For how to interpret this point, see note 3 above. 
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more obtrusive… does that which is ready-to-hand become – so much so, indeed, that it 
seems to lose its character of readiness-to-hand. It reveals itself as just present-at-hand 
and no more, which cannot be budged without the thing that is missing’ (Heidegger, 
1927: p.103). But now where one has a subject-object dichotomy, even a minimal one, 
the invitation to representation kicks in, making it eminently plausible that the agent’s 
epistemic access to the world will ultimately be secured by a representational route. This 
has implications for our understanding of Dreyfusian skills. As we have seen, for 
Dreyfus, to have a skill is to be equipped with a prior capacity to be flexibly sensitive to 
what is (normally) relevant in a certain context. The primary manifestation of such skills 
is during smooth coping in the domain of the ready-to-hand, where the associated 
phenomenology is non-representational in character. However, Dreyfusian skills are also 
manifested in certain cases of practical problem solving in the domain of the un-ready-to-
hand. What the present analysis tells us is that, in this second arena, those skills will have 
a representational phenomenology. 
 
So what will the representations characteristic of the un-ready-to-hand be like? We can 
answer this question, I believe, if we compare the domain of un-readiness-to-hand with 
that of presence-at-hand. When revealed as present-at-hand (e.g. by detached theoretical 
reflection) an entity will be experienced in terms of properties that are action-neutral, 
specifiable without essential reference to the representing agent, and context-
independent. Moreover, according to Heidegger, this group of properties will also 
characterize the contents of the agent’s related representational states.7 In the domain of 
the un-ready-to-hand, by contrast, an entity will be experienced in terms of properties that 
are action-specific, egocentric and dependent on a particular context of activity. 
Moreover, this second group of properties will also characterize the contents of the 
agent’s related representational states. So, in the domain of un-readiness-to-hand, we 
should expect to find representations that are action-specific, egocentric, and intrinsically 
context-dependent. And that is the profile of subagential action-oriented representation, 
as I have characterized it.  
 
Now, because context is woven into the fundamental operating principles by which 
situated special-purpose adaptive couplings function, such mechanisms do not face the 
difficulties of assigning relevance or of representing massively holistic networks of 
contextual significance that Dreyfus highlights in his analysis of the frame problem. Even 
where action-oriented representations are involved, the fact that those structures function 
as part of a situated special-purpose adaptive coupling means that relevance is guaranteed 
and what is represented is not context. To the extent that what is being represented by 
action-oriented representations remains knowledge that the environment is thus and so, it 
is a thus and so that is encoded in action-specific and agent-relative terms (e.g. ‘region-
to-be-avoided over there’). Such content makes sense only against the backdrop of 
intrinsic context-embeddedness provided by the rest of the mechanism, so the 
knowledge-that in question is not doing the specific job that opens the door to Dreyfus’ 
                                                 
7
 It does not follow from the fact that some of the agent’s representational states have 
contents with these properties that the agent herself is fully decontextualized (again see 
note 3 above).  
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worries about knowledge-how and knowledge-that, that is, it is not doing the job of 
explaining how we are equipped with a prior capacity to be flexibly sensitive to what is 
(normally) relevant in a particular context.    
 
It seems we are making headway. Unfortunately, it is time to face up to a serious 
difficulty. To bring this difficulty into view, we need to make a distinction between two 
different dimensions of the frame problem. The first, call it the intra-context frame 
problem, challenges us to say how a purely mechanistic system might achieve 
appropriate, flexible and fluid action within a context. The second, call it the inter-context 
frame problem challenges us to say how a purely mechanistic system might achieve 
appropriate, flexible and fluid action in worlds in which adaptation to new contexts is 
open-ended and in which the number of potential contexts is indeterminate. Earlier I 
made the point that the frame problem really bites in cases of the latter. We can now 
develop this point in an alternative way. In effect, I have been arguing in this section that 
the intra-context frame problem may be solved by a purely special-purpose mechanism, 
or by some suite of such mechanisms, perhaps featuring action-oriented representations, 
perhaps not. But from what I’ve said so far it remains mysterious how any collection of 
purely special-purpose mechanisms, whether or not they feature action-oriented 
representations, could ever solve the inter-context frame problem. So our new goal is to 
identify one or more mechanisms that might causally explain adaptive flexibility on a 
scale sufficient to account for open-ended adaptation to new contexts. Here is a 
suggestion.    
 
Most work in connectionist cognitive science has tended to concentrate on network 
architectures that, in effect, limit the range and complexity of the dynamics available to 
such a system. Restricting features include: neat symmetrical connectivity; noise-free 
processing; update properties which are based either on a global, digital pseudo-clock or 
on methods of stochastic change; units which are uniform in structure and function; 
activation passes that proceed in an orderly feed-forward fashion; and a model of 
neurotransmission in which the effect of one neuron’s activity on that of a connected 
neuron will simply be either excitatory or inhibitory, and will be mediated by a simple 
point-to-point signalling process. Quite recently, however, some researchers have come 
to favour a class of connectionist machines with richer system dynamics, so-called 
dynamical neural networks (henceforth DNNs).  
 
What we might, for convenience, call mark-one DNNs feature the following sorts of 
properties: asynchronous continuous-time processing; real-valued time delays on 
connections; non-uniform activation functions; deliberately introduced noise; and 
connectivity which is not only both directionally unrestricted and highly recurrent, but 
also not subject to symmetry constraints (see e.g. Husbands et al., 1995). Mark-two 
DNNs add two further twists to the architectural story. In these networks, christened 
GasNets (Husbands et al., 1998), the standard DNN model is augmented with modulatory 
neurotransmission (according to which fundamental properties of neurons, such as their 
activation profiles, are transformed by arriving neurotransmitters), and models of 
neurotransmitters that diffuse virtually from their source in a cloud-like, rather than a 
point-to-point, manner, and thus affect entire volumes of processing structures. GasNets 
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thus provide a platform for potentially rich interactions between two interacting and 
intertwined dynamical mechanisms – virtual cousins of the electrical and chemical 
processes in real nervous systems. Diffusing ‘clouds of chemicals’ may change the 
intrinsic properties of the artificial neurons, thereby changing the patterns of ‘electrical’ 
activity, while ‘electrical’ activity may itself trigger ‘chemical’ activity. So, dropping the 
scare quotes, these biologically inspired machines feature neurotransmitters that may not 
only transform the transfer functions of the neurons on which they act, but which may do 
so on a grand scale, as a result of the fact that they act by gaseous diffusion through 
volumes of brain-space, rather than by electrical transmission along connecting neural 
wires.  
 
Evolutionary algorithms have been used to design GasNet robot control systems for 
simple homing and discrimination tasks (Husbands et al., 1998). So what does the 
analysis of such machines tell us? Viewed as static wiring diagrams, many of the 
successful controllers appear to be rather simple structures. Typical GasNets feature a 
very small number of primitive visual receptors, connected to a tiny number of inner and 
motor neurons by just a few synaptic links. However, this apparent structural simplicity 
hides the fact that the dynamics of the networks are often highly complex, involving, as 
expected, subtle couplings between chemical and electrical processes. For example, it is 
common to find adaptive use being made of oscillatory dynamical sub-networks, some of 
whose properties (e.g., their periods) depend on spatial features of the modulation and 
diffusion processes, processes which are themselves determined by the changing levels of  
electrical activity in the neurons within the network. What seems clear is that GasNets 
realize a potentially powerful kind of ongoing structural fluidity, one that involves the 
functional reconfiguration of large networks of components. This is achieved on the basis 
of multiple simultaneous interactions and complex dynamic feedback loops, such that (a) 
the causal contribution of each systemic component partially determines, and is partially 
determined by, the causal contributions of large numbers of other systemic components, 
and, moreover, (b) those contributions may change radically over time. This is what 
Clark (1997) dubs continuous reciprocal causation, henceforth CRC. At root, then, 
GasNets are mechanisms of significant adaptive plasticity achieved on the basis of CRC, 
and although the empirical evidence is far from decisive, it seems plausible that it is this 
sort of system that, when harnessed and tuned appropriately by selection or learning to 
operate over different time-scales, may be the mechanistic basis of open-ended adaptation 
to new contexts.  
 
It is worth pointing out (since it will be relevant to what follows) that, to the extent that 
subagential representation requires the presence of a kind of internal modularity, one in 
which communicating subsystems inside the agent’s brain are conceptualized as 
trafficking in information carried by inner representational vehicles, there is a tension 
between CRC and action-oriented representation. Here I can provide only the barest 
bones of a justification for this claim. (For the full story, see Wheeler, 2005.) However, 
two things need to be said by way of support:   
 
1. The representational architecture of our spatial-navigation-robot 
discussed earlier has exactly the modular profile just mentioned. The 
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EMD-array is a module that produces object-related information which, 
realized as the action-oriented snap map of detected obstacles, is 
consumed (along with additional, goal-related information arriving from 
the supplementary visual system) by the modular subsystem that 
produces the motor map. The information carried by this second action-
oriented representation is then itself consumed by a further modular 
subsystem that transforms movement-specifications into actual physical 
motion.  
 
2. CRC undermines modularity because, as CRC increases, it becomes 
progressively more difficult to specify distinct and robust causal-
functional roles played by reliably reidentifiable parts of the system. The 
performance of any particular sub-task will increasingly be underpinned 
by larger and larger numbers of interacting components whose 
contributions are changing in highly context sensitive ways. Thus 
modular explanation, and so representational explanation, will be 
threatened.  
 
So much, I think, is true. Still, what this means is that CRC and action-oriented 
representation cannot be present in a single mechanism simultaneously. Nothing rules out 
their adaptively beneficial co-existence in the same mechanism over time, or indeed in 
different mechanisms simultaneously. Intriguingly, preliminary analysis suggests that 
some GasNets exhibit a kind of transient modularity in which, over time, the effects of 
the gaseous diffusible modulators drive the network through different phases of modular 
and non-modular (CRC-based) organization (Husbands, personal communication).  
 
5. Coping Trouble  
 
In a recent volley, Dreyfus (2008) has criticized my treatment of the frame problem. At 
the heart of Dreyfus’ critique is the accusation that I am propagating a ‘cognitivist 
misreading of Heidegger’ (p.341).8 This is not merely a dispute over who gets to call 
themselves Heideggerian. Dreyfus’ point is that my misreading of Heidegger leads me 
seriously astray in my handling of the frame problem. So what is my alleged mistake? 
Dreyfus objects to the way in which I locate action-oriented representation and practical 
problem-solving as part of the Heideggerian account. To be clear, my supposed error is 
not that I find a place for such states and processes. It is agreed on both sides (I think) 
that the phenomenology of un-readiness-to-hand has the character of representational 
problem solving. Furthermore, Dreyfus and I agree that it is an empirical question just 
how much of our everyday experience involves encounters with the ready-to-hand in 
non-representational smooth coping, as opposed to encounters with the un-ready-to-hand 
in practical problem solving characterized by action-oriented representations (p.346). 
However, what Dreyfus is keen to point out is that there exists a phenomenon that is 
ontologically more basic than smooth coping or action-oriented representational problem 
solving, a phenomenon to which I allegedly don’t do justice and that is critical in any 
                                                 
8
 All page numbers in this section refer to (Dreyfus, 2008), unless otherwise noted.  
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genuinely Heideggerian response to the frame problem. So let’s bring this phenomenon 
into view.        
 
The key here is a distinction that Dreyfus draws between skillful coping and background 
coping.  In the language that I have been using, skillful coping is another term for 
Dreyfusian skill, and so covers both smooth coping and the relevant examples of practical 
problem solving (see above). Background coping, on the other hand, is ‘an even more 
basic nonrepresentational holistic coping that allows copers to orient themselves in the 
world’ (p.345). In more detail: 
 
background coping is not a traditional kind of intentionality. Whereas the 
ready-to-hand has conditions of satisfaction, like hammering in the nail, 
background coping does not have conditions of satisfaction… The 
important point for Heidegger, but not for Wheeler, is that all coping, 
including unready-to-hand coping, takes place on the background of this 
basic non-representational, holistic, absorbed, kind of intentionality, 
which Heidegger calls being-in-the-world. (pp.345-6) 
 
So, for Heidegger and for Dreyfus, background coping is the human agent’s 
fundamental familiarity with her world that underpins both her smooth coping and 
her action-oriented representational problem solving. In fleshing out this idea, 
Dreyfus draws on Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) notion of the intentional arc. 
 
According to Merleau-Ponty, as an agent acquires skills, those skills are 
“stored,” not as representations in the agent’s mind, but as the 
solicitations of situations in the world.  What the learner acquires through 
experience is not represented at all but is presented to the learner as more 
and more finely discriminated situations.  If the situation does not clearly 
solicit a single response or if the response does not produce a satisfactory 
result, the learner is led to further refine his discriminations, which, in 
turn, solicit ever more refined responses.  For example, what we have 
learned from our experience of finding our way around in a city is 
“sedimented” in how that city looks to us. Merleau-Ponty calls this 
feedback loop between the embodied coper and the perceptual world the 
intentional arc. (p.340) 
 
Crucially, it is precisely the phenomenon of background coping, of knowing one’s way 
around one’s world, that, for Dreyfus, promises to dissolve the frame problem, in both its 
intra-context and inter-context forms. On the basis of our constantly honed background 
know-how, we respond directly to relevance, with context-bound entities soliciting or 
summoning us to act in ways shaped by our past experiences. And the capacity for 
flexible context-switching that lies at the heart of the inter-context frame problem is 
explained by the fact that I can be summoned not only by the present situation, but also 
by other situations that, because they have been relevant in the past, lie on the horizon of 
my experience (p.359). Given the existence, the ontological priority, the non-
representational character, and the frame-problem-busting consequences of  background 
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coping, ‘a Heideggerian Cognitive Science would require working out an ontology, 
phenomenology, and brain model that denies a basic role to any sort of representations’ 
(p.347). And that (Dreyfus tells us) just about wraps it up for my ‘pseudo-Heideggerian’ 
approach in which action-oriented representational problem solving plays a key part. 
Taking up the challenge to provide a positive cognitive-scientific story (a ‘brain model’), 
Dreyfus discusses at length the work of neuroscientist Walter Freeman (e.g. Freeman, 
2000). What emerges is a vision of the brain as a nonlinear non-representational 
dynamical system, primed by past experience to actively pick up and enrich significance, 
one whose constantly shifting attractor landscape physically grounds Merleau-Ponty’s 
intentional arc by causally explaining how newly encountered significances change the 
whole perceptual world of the agent.  (For the details, see pp.347-57.)        
 
Now, I agree with Dreyfus that background coping is the phenomenological structure on 
the basis of which our context sensitive activity is possible. Moreover, I plead guilty to 
not having paid sufficient attention to the phenomenon or its mechanistic basis in my 
account previously. So let me put that right. As Dreyfus himself observes, the causal 
processes realized in the neurodynamical brain described by Freeman, the causal 
processes that, Dreyfus has argued, underlie background coping, are plausibly interpreted 
as an instantiation of CRC. Recall, CRC is causation that involves multiple simultaneous 
interactions and complex dynamic feedback loops, such that (a) the causal contribution of 
each systemic component partially determines, and is partially determined by, the causal 
contributions of large numbers of other systemic components, and, moreover, (b) those 
contributions may change radically over time. Compare this specification with Freeman’s 
own description of the brain’s dynamics.  
 
I have observed that brain activity patterns are constantly dissolving, 
reforming and changing, particularly in relation to one another. When an 
animal learns to respond to a new odor, there is a shift in all other 
patterns, even if they are not directly involved with the learning.  
 
I conclude that context dependence is an essential property of the 
cerebral memory system, in which each new experience must change all 
of the existing store by some small amount, in order that a new entry be 
incorporated and fully deployed in the existing body of experience. 
(Freeman, 2000: p.22; quoted by Dreyfus, pp.352-3). 
 
So Dreyfus and I are in fundamental agreement here. Moreover, I have argued that CRC 
is a non-representational process, so to the extent that CRC is the mechanistic basis of 
background coping, I also agree with Dreyfus that the cognitive science of that 
phenomenon will be one that denies a basic role to any sort of representation. 
 
So where exactly is the disagreement? I have argued that CRC, when harnessed and 
tuned appropriately by selection or learning to operate over different time-scales, may 
well be the mechanistic basis of open-ended adaptation to new contexts. In other words, 
CRC causally explains fluid and flexible context-switching. And this is where the trouble 
starts. Dreyfus argues that, in the end, I remain problematically ambivalent about which 
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model of cognitive mechanism, CRC or action-oriented representation, is ontologically 
more basic (p.347). That’s because he thinks that all background coping, and not just the 
aspect that underlies fluid and flexible context-switching, must be explained by CRC. Put 
another way, Dreyfus thinks that it’s CRC that provides a causal dissolution of the intra-
context frame problem and not ‘just’ the inter-context version. And that, in part, is 
because he thinks that representations are a source of the frame problem. As he puts it: 
‘Wheeler’s own proposal… by introducing flexible action-oriented representations, like 
any representational approach has to face the frame problem head on’ (p.358). But, as far 
as I can see, not all forms of representation necessarily usher in the frame problem. The 
intra-context frame problem dissolves in the face of situated special-purpose adaptive 
couplings that use regular sensing of the environment, rather than detailed world models, 
to guide their behaviour. And Franceschini et al.’s robot, discussed earlier, shows that 
action-oriented representations can figure in such mechanisms. So does this mean that I 
am ambivalent about whether action-oriented representation or CRC is more basic? No it 
doesn’t. To see why, we need to be clear that at root it is not action-oriented 
representation that dissolves the intra-context frame problem, but rather the presence of 
situated special-purpose adaptive couplings. Representations may figure in such 
mechanisms, but they may not. Since CRC plays a critical role in dissolving the inter-
context frame problem, but action-oriented representation plays no equivalent role, there 
is a clear sense in which CRC is the ontologically more basic phenomenon.9  
 
If I am ambivalent about anything here, it’s about whether CRC or situated special-
purpose adaptive coupling is ontologically more basic. Since this is where the real 
disagreement between Dreyfus and me lies, let me finish with a few words on why I take 
this view. Background coping should not be thought of as some sort of distinct 
phenomenological ‘module’ to which smooth coping or practical problem solving may or 
may not be added. Rather, background coping is exhibited in, by being a structural 
precondition for, these context-embedded activities. Relatedly Heidegger (1927) draws a 
distinction between, on the one hand, the world and, on the other, the worldhood of the 
world. The former indicates the holistic semantic networks of context-defining 
involvements that we inhabit, the latter the abstract referential network structure that is 
shared by all concrete totalities of involvements. Similarly, the mechanistic basis of 
background coping constitutes a precondition, a causal-structural one, for the 
mechanisms that actually underlie smooth coping and practical problem solving. In fact 
the mechanistic basis of background coping has the dual character of CRC and situated 
special-purpose adaptive coupling. CRC is the causal-structural basis of fluid and flexible 
context-switching. Situated special-purpose adaptive coupling is the causal-structural 
                                                 
9
 In a personal communication with Dreyfus which he quotes (p.346), I unfortunately 
muddied the waters by making the error of treating CRC as the causal basis of the ready-
to-hand and action-oriented representation as the causal basis of the un-ready-to-hand. Of 
course, this was a mistake. The right thing for me to say is that these domains are 
distinguished by the non-representational or representational status of the situated 
special-purpose adaptive couplings involved. CRC will explain context-switching in 
either of the domains.  
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basis of intra-context sensitivity to relevance. Both are structural phenomena that are 
realized in particular ways by certain concrete mechanisms (GasNets, action-oriented 
maps, and so on). Both are, to use a term from Heidegger, equiprimordial. They are also, 
I believe, the mechanistic wellsprings of our resistance to the frame problem.  
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